Four targeted edits before forwarding to dav1d:
1. Add §0 cover note — names the three things the reviewer should
confirm (decomposition, per-surface derivations, conservative-
constant choice) and what's explicitly out of scope (empirical
validation against a real adversarial-training run).
2. Tighten §2 decomposition. The previous text invoked DPI to
produce an additive split I(A;C) ≤ I(A;Θ) + I(Θ;C), which DPI
alone doesn't justify. Replace with a clean Markov-chain DPI
statement (A → Θ → C(M) is a Markov chain conditional on
(H_{≤t}, n_t); DPI gives I(A;C) ≤ I(A;Θ)) and frame the T1+T2
baseline as threat-model-additive (disjoint adversary surfaces),
not information-additive in the same MI sense.
3. Rename §3 'Apply Fano's inequality' → 'discrete-distinguishability
counting'. The derivation log₂(SNR+1) is the discrete channel-
capacity bound on K distinguishable outputs, not Fano's
inequality (which bounds error probability from MI). Add an
explanatory note that LR factors cancel per-step (LR's distinct
channel contribution is §4, not double-counted here). Update §10
item 1 cross-reference for the same naming consistency.
4. Resolve §5 conjecture. Move the random-shuffle conjecture out of
the headline derivation; commit C_B3 = 1 strictly under the
adversarial-order assumption stated in §5. The random-shuffle
tightening C_B3 → O(1/√N_b) stays referenced via §10 + #000043
as the formal tightening path operators can opt into via the
--c-b3 calculator flag.
No numeric examples changed; no calculator behavior changed; no
reference list changed. Pure pre-review polish to remove three
specific things a careful cryptographer would catch and ask
about, plus a cover note that frames the kind of review wanted.
russell@unturf.com
8916bf3728