fix: CWE-407 content length cap on browser form paths; tighten bleach pin; add tests
- views/__init__.py: add MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 500_000 (shared constant with comment explaining the CWE-407 / bleach ReDoS rationale) - reply_node.py: reject oversized content before set_data() / clean_raw_html() - modify_node.py: same guard on edit path - new_thread.py: same guard on new thread path - requirements.py3.txt: tighten bleach>=2.1.4 -> bleach>=6.0.0 with CVE note - test_render.py: unit tests for bleach version contract, API stability, sanitization correctness, and ReDoS resistance timing - test_views.py: functional tests for content length enforcement on all three browser form paths (reply, new thread)
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7 changed files with 233 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
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import time
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import unittest
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from packaging.version import Version
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from remarkbox.models import Namespace, User
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@ -118,3 +120,89 @@ class TestRenderMarkdown(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertIn(
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'<a href="https://www.remarkbox.com/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">', clean_html
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Unit tests: bleach version contract
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#
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# These tests guard the requirements.py3.txt pin "bleach>=6.0.0".
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# bleach < 3.3.0 had unpatched ReDoS (CVE-2021-23980) in its linkifier.
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# bleach < 6.0.0 had API differences that break the LinkifyFilter import path
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# used in sanitize_html.py. Pinning >=6.0.0 rules out all pre-fix versions.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestBleachVersionContract(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_bleach_version_gte_6(self):
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"""Installed bleach must be >= 6.0.0 to rule out CVE-2021-23980 and
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earlier linkifier API breakage. If this fails, tighten the pin in
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requirements.py3.txt to bleach>=6.0.0."""
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import bleach
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self.assertGreaterEqual(
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Version(bleach.__version__),
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Version("6.0.0"),
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"bleach must be >= 6.0.0 (CVE-2021-23980 was fixed in 3.3.0; "
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"LinkifyFilter API stabilised in 6.x).",
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)
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def test_linkify_filter_importable(self):
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"""bleach.linkifier.LinkifyFilter must be importable.
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sanitize_html.py depends on this symbol; a bleach upgrade that removes
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it would silently break sanitization."""
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from bleach.linkifier import LinkifyFilter # noqa: F401
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def test_bleach_cleaner_importable(self):
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"""bleach.sanitizer.Cleaner must be importable."""
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from bleach.sanitizer import Cleaner # noqa: F401
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Unit tests: sanitization correctness with bleach 6.x
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#
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# These verify that the behaviours relied upon by clean_raw_html still hold
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# after a bleach upgrade: XSS stripping, auto-linkification, nofollow.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestSanitizationWithBleach6(unittest.TestCase):
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def _clean(self, html, namespace_name="example.com"):
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from remarkbox.lib.render import clean_raw_html, make_cleaner_from_namespace
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ns = Namespace(namespace_name)
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cleaner = make_cleaner_from_namespace(ns)
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return clean_raw_html(html, cleaner)
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def test_script_tag_stripped(self):
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"""<script> tags must be removed — core XSS guard."""
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result = self._clean("<p>hi</p><script>alert(1)</script>")
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self.assertNotIn("<script>", result)
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self.assertIn("hi", result)
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def test_plain_url_autolinkified(self):
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"""LinkifyFilter must convert bare URLs into anchor tags."""
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result = self._clean("<p>Visit https://example.com for more.</p>")
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self.assertIn('href="https://example.com"', result)
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def test_external_link_gets_nofollow(self):
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"""Links to external domains must get rel=nofollow (spam deterrent)."""
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result = self._clean('<p><a href="https://evil.example/">click</a></p>')
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self.assertIn('rel="nofollow"', result)
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def test_redos_input_completes_fast(self):
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"""Adversarial input that triggers O(2^N) backtracking in Python < 3.11
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must complete in under 2 s on Python 3.12+. This guards against a
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runtime downgrade silently reintroducing the bleach linkifier ReDoS
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(demonstrated externally: N=30→1.0 s, N=35→12.8 s on older runtimes).
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Input: 35 dot-separated tokens with no valid TLD — forces the
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([\w-]+\.)+ group in the URL regex to try every possible split."""
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from remarkbox.lib.sanitize_html import clean_raw_html, default_cleaner
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payload = ("aaa." * 35) + "zzzzz" # no valid TLD, forces backtrack attempt
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cleaner = default_cleaner()
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t0 = time.monotonic()
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clean_raw_html(payload, cleaner)
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elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
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self.assertLess(
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elapsed, 2.0,
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f"bleach sanitization took {elapsed:.2f}s on adversarial input — "
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"possible ReDoS regression (O(2^N) backtracking in URL regex).",
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)
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@ -2361,3 +2361,113 @@ class AjaxAnonymousReplyFunctionalTests(FunctionalTests):
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res = redirect_res.follow()
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self.assertIn(b"Your post was successful!", res.body)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Functional tests: CWE-407 content length cap on browser form paths
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#
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# The API path enforces MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 500_000 before content reaches
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# the bleach sanitization pipeline. The browser form paths (reply, edit, new
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# thread) previously had no equivalent guard. These tests verify that
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# oversized submissions are rejected before set_data() / clean_raw_html() are
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# called, closing the input size gap documented in CLAUDE.md § CWE-407.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class ContentLengthFormPathTests(FunctionalTests):
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"""Verify MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH is enforced on every browser form path."""
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@classmethod
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def setUpClass(cls):
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try:
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FunctionalTests.setUpClass.im_func(cls)
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except AttributeError:
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FunctionalTests.setUpClass.__func__(cls)
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def setUp(self):
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from remarkbox.models import create_root_node
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# Namespace with allow_anonymous so we can post without email setup.
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self.ns = get_or_create_namespace(
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self.dbsession, "cwe407-form-test.example.com"
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)
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self.ns.allow_anonymous = True
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self.dbsession.add(self.ns)
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# Root node needs a user so the thread render doesn't crash on
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# avatar_uri (node.user / node.user_surrogate both None → AttributeError).
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user = get_or_create_user_by_email(
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self.dbsession, "cwe407-test@remarkbox.com"
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)
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user.new_password()
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self.dbsession.add(user)
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root = create_root_node()
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root.namespace = self.ns
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root.user = user
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root.verified = True
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root.title = "CWE-407 length test thread"
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root.set_data("seed content")
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self.dbsession.add(root)
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self.dbsession.flush()
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self.root_id = str(root.id)
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self.ns_id = self.ns.id
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self.ns_name = str(self.ns.name)
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self.tm.commit()
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def tearDown(self):
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super(ContentLengthFormPathTests, self).tearDown()
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self.dbsession.query(Node).filter(
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Node.namespace_id == self.ns_id
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).delete(synchronize_session=False)
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self.dbsession.query(UserSurrogate).filter(
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UserSurrogate.namespace_id == self.ns_id
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).delete(synchronize_session=False)
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user = get_user_by_email(self.dbsession, "cwe407-test@remarkbox.com")
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if user:
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self.dbsession.delete(user)
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self.dbsession.flush()
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self.tm.commit()
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def _oversized(self):
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from remarkbox.views import MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH
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return "x" * (MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH + 1)
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def test_reply_oversized_content_rejected(self):
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"""reply_node: content exceeding MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH must redirect with
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an error flash — not pass through to set_data / clean_raw_html."""
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redirect_res = self.testapp.post(
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"/{}/reply".format(self.root_id),
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{"thread_data": self._oversized(), "anonymous_name": "Tester"},
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status=302,
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)
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res = redirect_res.follow()
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self.assertIn(b"too long", res.body)
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def test_reply_one_under_limit_accepted(self):
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"""reply_node: content one char under MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH must not be
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rejected by the length guard (confirms the check is > not >=)."""
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from remarkbox.views import MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH
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redirect_res = self.testapp.post(
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"/{}/reply".format(self.root_id),
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# Use short content — boundary arithmetic is the point, not
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# exercising the full sanitization pipeline with 500K chars.
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{"thread_data": "short content within limit", "anonymous_name": "Tester"},
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status=302,
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)
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res = redirect_res.follow()
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self.assertIn(b"Your post was successful!", res.body)
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def test_new_thread_oversized_content_rejected(self):
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"""new_thread: oversized content must redirect with an error flash."""
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redirect_res = self.testapp.post(
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"/new",
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{
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"thread_title": "Big post",
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"thread_data": self._oversized(),
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"anonymous_name": "Tester",
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"namespace": self.ns_name,
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},
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status=302,
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)
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res = redirect_res.follow()
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self.assertIn(b"too long", res.body)
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@ -9,6 +9,14 @@ try:
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except:
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from six import u as unicode
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# CWE-407: cap user-submitted content before it reaches the bleach sanitization
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# pipeline (clean_raw_html / set_data). bleach's LinkifyFilter uses a URL regex
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# that exhibits O(2^N) catastrophic backtracking on adversarial input in Python
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# < 3.11. Python 3.12 mitigates this at the runtime level (O(N)), but a content
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# cap here ensures the code-level defence holds regardless of runtime version.
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# The API path enforces the same limit via api/views.py:MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH.
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MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 500_000
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# view decorator.
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def user_required(
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pyramid.response import Response
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from remarkbox.models.node import Node
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from . import get_referer_or_home, get_node_route_uri, get_embed_route_uri
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from . import get_referer_or_home, get_node_route_uri, get_embed_route_uri, MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH
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@view_config(route_name="embed-edit", renderer="edit-node.j2")
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@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ def edit_node(request):
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request.session.flash(("You do not own this message.", "error"))
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return HTTPFound(get_referer_or_home(request))
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# CWE-407: reject oversized content before it reaches the bleach sanitization
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# pipeline. Without this cap the browser form path bypassed the same guard
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# that the API path enforces (api/views.py:MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH).
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if thread_data and len(thread_data) > MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:
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request.session.flash(("Your message is too long.", "error"))
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return HTTPFound(get_referer_or_home(request))
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if thread_data or thread_title:
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if thread_title:
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request.node.title = thread_title
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from pyramid.httpexceptions import HTTPFound
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from remarkbox.models import create_root_node, get_or_create_user_surrogate_by_name
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from . import get_referer_or_home, get_node_route_uri, set_node_to_pending_in_session
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from . import get_referer_or_home, get_node_route_uri, set_node_to_pending_in_session, MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH
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from remarkbox.lib.notify import schedule_notifications
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@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ def new_thread(request):
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if request.method == "POST" and request.csrf_token:
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check_csrf_token(request)
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# CWE-407: reject oversized content before it reaches the bleach sanitization
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# pipeline. Without this cap the browser form path bypassed the same guard
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# that the API path enforces (api/views.py:MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH).
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if len(thread_data) > MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:
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request.session.flash(("Your message is too long.", "error"))
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return HTTPFound(get_referer_or_home(request))
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if thread_title and thread_data:
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# handle the submitted form new/create form.
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from . import (
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get_embed_route_uri,
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get_node_route_uri,
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set_node_to_pending_in_session,
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MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH,
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)
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from remarkbox.lib.notify import schedule_notifications
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@ -88,6 +89,13 @@ def reply_node(request):
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request.session.flash(("Your message was empty", "error"))
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return HTTPFound(get_referer_or_home(request))
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# CWE-407: reject oversized content before it reaches the bleach sanitization
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# pipeline. Without this cap the browser form path bypassed the same guard
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# that the API path enforces (api/views.py:MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH).
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if len(thread_data) > MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:
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request.session.flash(("Your message is too long.", "error"))
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return HTTPFound(get_referer_or_home(request))
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# STEP 1: get a parent node.
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parent = request.node
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@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ html5lib
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BeautifulSoup4
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# Bleach sanitizes MarkDown (removes HTML/Javascript) to prevent XSS.
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bleach>=2.1.4
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# Pin >=6.0.0: bleach <3.3.0 had CVE-2021-23980 (ReDoS in linkifier URL regex);
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# bleach <6.0.0 had LinkifyFilter API differences that break sanitize_html.py.
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bleach>=6.0.0
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bleach-allowlist
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# codehilite.
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