Different agents have different value functions on the same providence
records. Today aborist bakes one canonicalization policy into
governance_policy_hash and calls it universal. This adds two knobs that
let agents express their preference without breaking provenance.
- aborist/qa/keys.py: `canonical_question(q, mode=...)` and
`question_hash(q, mode=...)` accept "strict" (NFC + ws-collapse only;
every variant gets its own hash) or "equivalence_class" (default —
additionally lowercase + trailing-punct strip + article strip).
New constants: QUESTION_DEDUP_MODES, FIDELITY_MODES, defaults.
- aborist/qa/query.py + aborist/qa/runner.py: each call computes the
primary cache_key under policy["question_dedup"]. New `fidelity`
parameter:
"strict" only primary cache_key checked
"equivalence_class" primary first; if miss AND alternate mode
produces a different cache_key, try alternate
Cross-silo fallback works because _ckey_for_mode rewrites
policy["question_dedup"] to the alternate mode before computing
governance_policy_hash — so the fallback ckey matches what an agent
under that mode would have written. Lookups can find each other's
records when fidelity permits. Result dict gains `lookup_path` ∈
{"strict", "equivalence_class", "strict_fallback",
"equivalence_class_fallback", "miss"}.
- aborist/cli.py: `--question-dedup` and `--fidelity` flags on the
`query` subcommand. Human render annotates cache_hit lines that
came from a fallback ckey ("cached via equivalence_class_fallback").
- tests/test_query.py: three new regressions
* strict-policy + strict-fidelity: variants get distinct cache_keys
* cross-silo fallback: strict-policy reads eq-class-policy records
via fidelity=equivalence_class
* strict-fidelity refuses fallback (audit-grade): cache miss even
when the alternate silo has a hit
- CLAUDE.md: dedup-mode and fidelity convention bullets updated.
This is V1 + V2 of the substrate move sketched in conversation: write
policy determines which silo a record lives in; read fidelity determines
how loosely an agent walks across silos. Records stay exactly-keyed
(provenance hard); routing is per-agent (preference soft). Same
verifier_no_diagnostics discipline holds — no soft signal enters the
hard chain.
442 tests pass.
210 lines
8 KiB
Python
210 lines
8 KiB
Python
"""The 8-dim Merkle-AGI v9.8 cache_key.
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v9.8 invariant: no answer is reused unless all eight match and the
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record is live (not failed/stale/quarantined):
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1. source_root — content fingerprint of the document
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2. question_hash — SHA-256 of normalized question text
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3. model_profile_hash — model_id + revision + quantization
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4. conversation_hash — full canonical OpenAI messages array
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5. governance_policy_hash — sampling/policy parameters dict
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6. schema_version — aborist DB schema version
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7. canonicalization_version — text normalization rules
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8. chunking_version — chunker name & parameters
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Bumping ANY of these eight dimensions yields a distinct cache_key, so
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prior records cannot be served. This is the runtime drift detection
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the providence whitepaper compresses into "cache_key = source_root +
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':' + question_hash" — that's a simplification; the rigorous form is
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all eight dimensions hashed together.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import json
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from aborist.document import canonicalize
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def _sha256(s: str) -> str:
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return hashlib.sha256(s.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
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def _canonical_json(obj) -> str:
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return json.dumps(obj, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
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QUESTION_DEDUP_MODES = ("strict", "equivalence_class")
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DEFAULT_QUESTION_DEDUP = "equivalence_class"
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# Lookup-time fidelity. Decoupled from write-time `question_dedup`:
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# write determines under which `cache_key` a record lands; fidelity
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# determines which `cache_key`s a lookup will check.
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#
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# strict only the cache_key matching the agent's policy
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# is checked. No fallback. Audit-grade behavior.
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# equivalence_class primary cache_key checked first; if miss AND the
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# OTHER dedup mode produces a different cache_key,
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# the alternate is also checked. Lets a fast-cache
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# agent reuse records written under either mode.
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FIDELITY_MODES = ("strict", "equivalence_class")
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DEFAULT_FIDELITY = "equivalence_class"
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def canonical_question(
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question: str, *, mode: str = DEFAULT_QUESTION_DEDUP
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) -> str:
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"""Canonical form of `question` for the given dedup ``mode``.
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Two modes:
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- ``"equivalence_class"`` (default): four-step canonicalization —
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``canonicalize()`` (NFC + ws-collapse + strip ends), then
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lowercase, then trailing-punctuation strip, then standalone-article
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filter (``the``, ``a``, ``an``). All variants of "Who is THE
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Batman?" / "who is batman" / "who is X." collapse to one form.
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The default for chat-style agents that prefer fast cache hits.
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- ``"strict"``: only ``canonicalize()`` — NFC + ws-collapse + strip
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ends. Case-sensitive, punctuation-sensitive, article-sensitive.
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Maximum granularity. The choice for audit-grade agents that want
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every distinct phrasing to get its own answer.
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Exposed as a function so callers can dedup BEFORE hashing — e.g.
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inject the canonical form into the user message used for
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``conversation_hash``, while still sending the verbatim question to
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the LLM. Without this split ``"who is batman"``, ``"who is
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batman?"``, and ``"who is the batman?"`` collapse on
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``question_hash`` (under equivalence_class) but each hits
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``conversation_hash`` differently, missing cache.
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The choice of mode flows through ``policy["question_dedup"]`` into
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``governance_policy_hash`` so two agents under different modes
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write records under different ``cache_key``s — they coexist in
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parallel namespaces, never collide.
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"""
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if mode not in QUESTION_DEDUP_MODES:
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raise ValueError(
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f"question dedup mode must be one of {QUESTION_DEDUP_MODES}, got {mode!r}"
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)
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canon = canonicalize(question)
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if mode == "strict":
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return canon
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canon = canon.lower().rstrip(_QUESTION_TRAILING_STRIP)
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tokens = [t for t in canon.split() if t not in _QUESTION_ARTICLE_STRIP]
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return " ".join(tokens)
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def question_hash(
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question: str, *, mode: str = DEFAULT_QUESTION_DEDUP
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) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of the dedup-mode-canonicalized question.
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See ``canonical_question`` for what each mode does. The hash is the
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SHA-256 of the canonical form. Bumping
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``_QUESTION_TRAILING_STRIP`` or ``_QUESTION_ARTICLE_STRIP`` (the
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equivalence-class strip sets) orphans prior cache records whose
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canonical question contained newly-stripped tokens; they live as
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history but won't be re-hit on lookup.
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Equivalence class examples (mode="equivalence_class")::
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"who is X" |
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"who is X?" |
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"Who Is X." | -> same question_hash
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"who is the X" |
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"who is a X" |
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"who is an X?" | (CJK question mark)
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Strict mode (mode="strict") distinguishes all of those.
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What's IN the trailing-strip set: ``.?!,;:`` (ASCII), ``?!。、``
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(CJK full-width), ``…`` (ellipsis). Pairs like ``"`` ``'`` ``)``
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``]`` ``}`` are NOT — naive one-sided stripping breaks balance.
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Apostrophes aren't either — ``X's`` is a different question from
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``X``.
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"""
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return _sha256(canonical_question(question, mode=mode))
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# Trailing punctuation that carries no semantic difference at the end
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# of a question. Order doesn't matter (rstrip walks char-by-char from
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# the right). Repeats handled trivially: ``X???`` → ``X``.
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#
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# ASCII: . ? ! , ; :
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# CJK: ? U+FF1F full-width question mark
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# ! U+FF01 full-width exclamation
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# 。 U+3002 ideographic full stop
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# 、 U+3001 ideographic comma
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# Other: … U+2026 horizontal ellipsis
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_QUESTION_TRAILING_STRIP = ".?!,;:?!。、…"
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# English articles stripped as standalone tokens after lowercasing. The
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# question equivalence class treats "the foo" and "foo" as the same
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# question — fox's 2026-04-29 catch: `who is the batman` & `who is
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# batman` produced different cache records under earlier rules. Tokens
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# are matched as EXACT lowercase strings, so substrings like "thesis"
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# (contains "the") stay untouched.
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#
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# Conservative on purpose: only ASCII English articles. "El", "la",
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# "los", "le", "les", "der", "die", "das" etc. are not stripped today.
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# Adding them when needed flows through the same equivalence-class
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# expansion the trailing-punctuation set went through.
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_QUESTION_ARTICLE_STRIP = frozenset({"the", "a", "an"})
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def model_profile_hash(
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model_id: str, revision: str = "", quantization: str = ""
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) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of model identity. Bumping any field bumps the cache key."""
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return _sha256(f"{model_id}|{revision}|{quantization}")
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def conversation_hash(messages: list[dict]) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of canonical JSON of the full OpenAI messages array.
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Order matters: a 6-turn dialogue arriving at the same final question
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produces a different hash than a single-turn ask.
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"""
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return _sha256(_canonical_json(messages))
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def governance_policy_hash(policy: dict) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of canonical JSON of the sampling/policy dict.
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Includes temperature, top_p, max_tokens, and the system prompt — any
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of those changing means the answer is governed differently and the
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cache must miss.
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"""
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return _sha256(_canonical_json(policy))
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def cache_key(
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source_root: str,
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question_hash_value: str,
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model_profile_hash_value: str,
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conversation_hash_value: str,
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governance_policy_hash_value: str,
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schema_version: str,
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canonicalization_version: str,
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chunking_version: str,
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) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of all 8 dimensions joined with '|'.
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Any drift in any dimension produces a distinct cache_key.
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"""
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return _sha256(
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"|".join(
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[
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source_root,
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question_hash_value,
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model_profile_hash_value,
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conversation_hash_value,
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governance_policy_hash_value,
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schema_version,
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canonicalization_version,
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chunking_version,
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]
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)
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)
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