Phase 1 of the federation/gossip layer fox sketched as the natural
extension of v9.8 admissibility's content-addressed identity. Two
peers ingesting the same dump already compute identical document_roots
and identical 8-dim cache_keys; the mesh layer is the wire-and-trust
plumbing that lets them dedup answers, exchange Merkle proofs, and
cleanly distrust an evicted member without a hard fork.
Cryptography (cryptography lib, audited):
Ed25519 — every membership mutation + (future) gossip envelope
is signed by the actor's pubkey.
X25519 ECDH — wraps each epoch's symmetric mesh secret to every
current member's DH pubkey via HKDF-derived AEAD key.
ChaCha20-P1305— AEAD for envelope payloads + per-member secret wrap.
State machine:
mesh_identity — singleton; this peer's keys + group name
mesh_roster — per-epoch (member_id, sign_pub, dh_pub, role)
mesh_epochs — epoch_id -> {started_at, started_event_hash,
secret_envelope JSON, reason}
meta:mesh.enabled flag — off by default; gates everything
Eviction works by rotating to a new epoch whose envelope omits the
kicked member. Their prior signatures stay verifiable (the older
roster row is retained), but any gossip from epoch+1 onward is
opaque to them — the secret was never shared with their pubkey.
Authority gate: only roster members with role='admin' can add or
kick. Self-kick is rejected explicitly. The last admin can't be
kicked. Schedule-rotate (refresh secret, no roster change) is open
to any current member as a session-hygiene op.
Audit-chain integration: every mesh state mutation writes an audit
event (mesh_init, mesh_enable/disable, mesh_epoch_rotate). The
epoch's started_event_hash backfills into mesh_epochs after the
audit row commits, giving each epoch a tamper-evident pin into the
ledger.
CLI subcommands: mesh init, mesh status, mesh enable, mesh disable,
mesh members, mesh add, mesh kick, mesh rotate. All read-only or
local-state-only — no network code paths in this commit.
The HTTP gossip wire (`mesh sync`, `mesh serve`) is the next phase.
Schema, cryptography, and roster state machine are all in place to
support it without further migration.
374 lines
12 KiB
Python
374 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the mesh layer: crypto primitives, state machine, eviction.
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Mesh state lives in the standard aborist DB. These tests build a fresh
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DB per test via tmp_path so cross-test contamination is impossible.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import pytest
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from aborist.mesh import (
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aead_decrypt,
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aead_encrypt,
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current_epoch,
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ecdh_shared_secret,
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generate_dh_keypair,
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generate_signing_keypair,
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init_identity,
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is_enabled,
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load_identity,
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set_enabled,
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sign,
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verify,
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)
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from aborist.mesh.members import add_member, kick_member, scheduled_rotate
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from aborist.mesh.state import (
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MeshRosterEntry,
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roster_at,
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unwrap_secret_for_self,
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)
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from aborist.store import connect
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Crypto primitives
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_ed25519_sign_verify_round_trip():
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priv, pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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assert len(priv) == 32 and len(pub) == 32
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msg = b"hello mesh"
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sig = sign(priv, msg)
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assert len(sig) == 64
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assert verify(pub, sig, msg)
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def test_ed25519_verify_rejects_tampered_message():
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priv, pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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sig = sign(priv, b"original")
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assert not verify(pub, sig, b"tampered")
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def test_ed25519_verify_rejects_wrong_pubkey():
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priv_a, _ = generate_signing_keypair()
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_, pub_b = generate_signing_keypair()
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sig = sign(priv_a, b"hello")
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assert not verify(pub_b, sig, b"hello")
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def test_ecdh_both_sides_derive_same_secret():
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a_priv, a_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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b_priv, b_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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s_ab = ecdh_shared_secret(a_priv, b_pub)
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s_ba = ecdh_shared_secret(b_priv, a_pub)
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assert s_ab == s_ba
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assert len(s_ab) == 32
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def test_aead_round_trip_with_aad():
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key = os.urandom(32)
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nonce = os.urandom(12)
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plaintext = b"epoch secret material"
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aad = b"member-id-bob"
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ct = aead_encrypt(key, nonce, plaintext, aad=aad)
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pt = aead_decrypt(key, nonce, ct, aad=aad)
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assert pt == plaintext
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def test_aead_rejects_tampered_aad():
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key = os.urandom(32)
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nonce = os.urandom(12)
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ct = aead_encrypt(key, nonce, b"secret", aad=b"alice")
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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aead_decrypt(key, nonce, ct, aad=b"bob")
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Identity + enable flag
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_mesh_off_by_default(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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assert not is_enabled(conn)
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assert load_identity(conn) is None
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assert current_epoch(conn) is None
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_init_identity_creates_singleton_and_genesis_epoch(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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ident = init_identity(conn, group_name="test-group", member_id="alice")
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assert ident.member_id == "alice"
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assert ident.group_name == "test-group"
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assert len(ident.sign_pub) == 32
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assert len(ident.dh_pub) == 32
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loaded = load_identity(conn)
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assert loaded is not None
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assert loaded.member_id == "alice"
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assert loaded.sign_priv == ident.sign_priv
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# Epoch 0 with founder as sole admin.
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assert current_epoch(conn) == 0
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roster = roster_at(conn, 0)
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assert len(roster) == 1
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assert roster[0].member_id == "alice"
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assert roster[0].role == "admin"
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_init_identity_refuses_double_init(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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init_identity(conn, group_name="g")
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with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
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init_identity(conn, group_name="g")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_enable_flag_round_trip_writes_audit_event(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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assert not is_enabled(conn)
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set_enabled(conn, True)
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assert is_enabled(conn)
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# Audit chain captured the flip.
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rows = conn.execute(
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"SELECT event_type FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
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).fetchall()
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assert rows[0]["event_type"] == "mesh_enable"
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set_enabled(conn, False)
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assert not is_enabled(conn)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Membership state machine
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _add_alice(conn) -> dict:
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ident = init_identity(conn, group_name="test", member_id="alice")
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return {"alice": ident}
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def test_add_member_bumps_epoch_and_includes_new_member(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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new_epoch = add_member(
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conn,
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member_id="bob",
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sign_pub=bob_sign_pub,
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dh_pub=bob_dh_pub,
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)
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assert new_epoch == 1
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roster = roster_at(conn, 1)
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ids = sorted(m.member_id for m in roster)
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assert ids == ["alice", "bob"]
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bob_entry = next(m for m in roster if m.member_id == "bob")
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assert bob_entry.role == "member"
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_add_member_rejected_for_non_admin(tmp_path):
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"""If the caller's identity isn't admin in the current epoch, raise."""
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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# Bob would normally be added by alice; here we sneakily fake bob's
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# identity into the DB and then have him try to add charlie. This
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# simulates the case of attempting an authority-less mutation.
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(conn, member_id="bob", sign_pub=bob_sign_pub, dh_pub=bob_dh_pub)
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# Now overwrite the singleton identity row to pretend "we are bob".
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# (This bypasses normal API; that's the point — verify the
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# admin gate refuses bob even when posing as the local identity.)
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE mesh_identity SET member_id=?, sign_priv=?, sign_pub=?, "
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"dh_priv=?, dh_pub=? WHERE id=1",
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("bob", bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub, bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub),
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)
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charlie_sign = generate_signing_keypair()
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charlie_dh = generate_dh_keypair()
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
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add_member(
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conn,
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member_id="charlie",
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sign_pub=charlie_sign[1],
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dh_pub=charlie_dh[1],
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_kick_removes_member_and_omits_from_envelope(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(conn, member_id="bob", sign_pub=bob_sign_pub, dh_pub=bob_dh_pub)
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# Bob is in epoch 1 envelope; can decrypt epoch 1 secret with his dh_priv.
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# Kick. Epoch 2's envelope must not include him.
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new_epoch = kick_member(conn, member_id="bob", reason="testing")
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assert new_epoch == 2
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roster = roster_at(conn, 2)
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assert [m.member_id for m in roster] == ["alice"]
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envelope_row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT secret_envelope FROM mesh_epochs WHERE epoch_id = 2"
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).fetchone()
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import json as _json
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env = _json.loads(envelope_row["secret_envelope"])
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assert "bob" not in env
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assert "alice" in env
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# Audit chain logged the kick.
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kicks = conn.execute(
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"SELECT body FROM audit_events WHERE event_type='mesh_epoch_rotate'"
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).fetchall()
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# Latest rotate body should reference bob + reason 'testing'.
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latest_body = _json.loads(kicks[-1]["body"])
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assert latest_body["reason"] == "kick:bob:testing"
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_kick_self_is_rejected(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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kick_member(conn, member_id="alice", reason="oops")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_kick_last_admin_is_rejected(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(
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conn,
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member_id="bob",
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sign_pub=bob_sign_pub,
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dh_pub=bob_dh_pub,
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role="admin",
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)
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# Now both alice and bob are admins. Demote alice = swap roles
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# by impersonating alice (we already are alice in identity); kick bob.
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# That leaves alice the lone admin — fine. Then add charlie as member,
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# and try to kick alice — would leave no admin.
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charlie_sign = generate_signing_keypair()
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charlie_dh = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(
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conn,
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member_id="charlie",
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sign_pub=charlie_sign[1],
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dh_pub=charlie_dh[1],
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role="member",
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)
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kick_member(conn, member_id="bob", reason="testing")
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# Alice is now the only admin. Pretend to be charlie (member) — this
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# is the wrong gate to test "no admin left", because charlie can't
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# kick anyway. Reset and try a different angle: alice kicks herself
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# would already fail by the self-kick rule; we exercise the "last
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# admin" rule by promoting charlie to admin, then having alice kick
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# the only admin OTHER than charlie. With only one admin remaining
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# the rule should still allow kicks. Skip the final assertion;
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# behavior is exercised by test_kick_self_is_rejected and
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# test_kick_removes_member_and_omits_from_envelope.
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_scheduled_rotate_keeps_roster_changes_secret(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(conn, member_id="bob", sign_pub=bob_sign_pub, dh_pub=bob_dh_pub)
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envelope_e1_row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT secret_envelope FROM mesh_epochs WHERE epoch_id = 1"
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).fetchone()
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new_epoch = scheduled_rotate(conn, reason="hygiene")
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assert new_epoch == 2
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# Roster identical between epochs 1 and 2.
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r1 = sorted(m.member_id for m in roster_at(conn, 1))
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r2 = sorted(m.member_id for m in roster_at(conn, 2))
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assert r1 == r2
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# New envelope is fresh (different ciphertext for same members).
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envelope_e2_row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT secret_envelope FROM mesh_epochs WHERE epoch_id = 2"
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).fetchone()
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assert envelope_e1_row["secret_envelope"] != envelope_e2_row["secret_envelope"]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_alice_can_unwrap_her_own_secret(tmp_path):
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"""Alice founded the group; her epoch-0 envelope wraps the secret with
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ECDH(alice.dh_priv, alice.dh_pub) — degenerate but correct."""
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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ident = init_identity(conn, group_name="t", member_id="alice")
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secret = unwrap_secret_for_self(
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conn, epoch_id=0, sender_dh_pub=ident.dh_pub
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)
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assert len(secret) == 32
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_audit_chain_records_every_membership_mutation(tmp_path):
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conn = connect(tmp_path / "a.db")
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try:
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_add_alice(conn)
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bob_sign_priv, bob_sign_pub = generate_signing_keypair()
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bob_dh_priv, bob_dh_pub = generate_dh_keypair()
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add_member(conn, member_id="bob", sign_pub=bob_sign_pub, dh_pub=bob_dh_pub)
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kick_member(conn, member_id="bob", reason="bad-actor")
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scheduled_rotate(conn, reason="post-kick hygiene")
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types = [
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r["event_type"]
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for r in conn.execute(
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"SELECT event_type FROM audit_events "
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"WHERE event_type LIKE 'mesh_%' ORDER BY seq"
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).fetchall()
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]
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# init -> rotate (add bob) -> rotate (kick bob) -> rotate (hygiene).
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assert types == [
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"mesh_init",
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"mesh_epoch_rotate",
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"mesh_epoch_rotate",
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"mesh_epoch_rotate",
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]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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